Mára egy Japánnal kapcsolatos gyűjteményt hoztam.
Che Guevara 1959-ben járt a távol-keleti országban, hogy kereskedelmi és diplomáciai kapcsolatokat kössön a japán kormánnyal és arra is szánt időt, hogy ellátogasson az amerikai atombomba által elpusztított Hiroshimába.

Video:

~ Japán dokumentumfilm Che Guevara-ról [megnézem]

A filmben láthatóak fényképek és rövid videobejátszások Che-ről, amint beszédet tart vagy éppen önkéntes munkát végez;  részletek a Benicio Del Toro főszereplésével készült kétrészes Che című filmből, és hallható néhány japán tisztviselők visszaemlékezése is.

Cikkek:

~ Che Guevara, his affections from Hiroshima
~ Che Guevara’s daughter visits bomb memorial in Hiroshima
 

For today, I have brought you a collection in connection with Japan.
Che Guevara visited the country in 1959 in order to make commercial and diplomatic relations with the Japanese government and he devoted time to visit Hiroshima, the city, destroyed by the American atomic bomb.

Video:

~ Japanese documentary about Che Guevara [check it out]

In the film you can see photos and short video footage of Che Guevara, his making speech or doing voluntary work; some scenes from the film 'Che' starring Benicio Del Toro, and you can also listen to Japanese officials remembering Che.

Articles:

~ Che Guevara, his affections from Hiroshima
~ Che Guevara’s daughter visits bomb memorial in Hiroshima
 

Mára két rövid, de annál klasszabb videofilmet hoztam a számotokra, amelyek Che Guevara 1959-es egyiptomi tartózkodásáról szólnak: indulás Havannából (Aleida is elkísérte a férjét a repülőtérre), találkozás Nasszer egyiptomi elnökkel, a szokásos kézrázások, majd Nasszer elbúcsúztatja a vendégeit.
A videókért köszönet Chemenna-nak, aki feltöltötte őket a Tumblr oldalára!
 
[Video]
 

For today I have brought you two short, but really amazing videofilms that show Che Guevara during his visit to Egypt in 1959: leaving Havana for Cairo (Aleida saw her husband off at the airport), meeting the Egyptian President Nasser, the traditional handshakes, then Nasser saw his visitors goodbye.
For the videos, a big thank you for Chemenna who posted them on her Tumblr page!

[Video] 
 

Vallegrande (Bolívia) az a város, ahol titokban eltemették Che Guevara-t és a gerilláit - hogy harminc évvel később megtalálják őket.
A város teljes neve: Jesús y Montes Claros de los Caballeros del Valle Grande, és Santa Cruz-hoz, az ország egyik leggazdagabb és legfontosabb régiójához tartozik.

Miután az egyesült bolíviai és észak-amerikai erők (a CIA segítségével) elfogták és meggyilkolták Che-t és néhány harcosát La Higuera-ban (csak öt gerillának sikerült elmenkülnie és Chilébe jutnia), Che holttestét takaróba csavarták, egy helikopter talpához kötözték és Vallegrande-ba szállították.
A testet a Nuestra Señora de Malta kórházának halottmosó helyiségében terítették ki, megmosták, majd lefotózták és filmre vették a Krisztus-szerű holttestet.
Ma a halottmosó helyiséget már nem használják, zarándokhely lett belőle, ahol a többezer látogató különböző graffitikkel tiszteleg a hősies gerilla emléke előtt.

Miután elkészültek a fotók, a holttest eltűnt. A hivatalos magyarázat szerint elhamvasztották és a hamvakat egy repülőgépről szórták szét a dzsungel felett. Azonban harminc évvel később kiderült, hogy mindez hazugság volt.

Che és gerilláinak holttestét egy régi repülőtér kifutója alá temették Vallegrande külvárosában. A maradványokat 1997-ben találták meg, miután 1995-ben egy nyugdíjba vonult bolíviai tiszt, Mario Vargas Salinas, aki részt vett Che elfogásában és meggyilkolásában, elmondta az igazságot. Beszélt az amerikai újságíróval, Jon Lee Andersonnal, aki akkor éppen információt gyűjtött Che-ről a készülő életrajzához.
Kiterjedt kutatás kezdődött kubai, argentín és olasz antropológusok, történészek és geofizikusok részvételével, akik tíz kilométeres körzetben átvizsgálták a talajt. Több sírt találtak és még Tania (Tamara Bunke Bider) sírját is, aki két kilométerre a bajtársaitól temettek el.

1997 június 28-án hét sírt azonosítottak: Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara, a kubai René Martínez Tamayo (Arturo), Alberto Fernández Montes de Oca (Pacho) és Orlando Pantoja Tamayo (Antonio), a bolíviai Simeón Cuba (Willy) és Aniceto Reynaga (Aniceto), és a perui Juan Pablo Chang (El Chino).

Ma egy mauzóleum áll az ásatások helyén. Nyolc sírkő jelzi a helyet, ahol a gerillákat és a parancsnokukat eltemették és megtalálták.

[Galéria 13 fotóval]

Forrás
 

Vallegrande (Bolivia) is the town where Che Guevara and his guerrilla fighters were buried in secret - only to be found thirty years later.
The full name of the town is Jesús y Montes Claros de los Caballeros del Valle Grande, and it belongs to Santa Cruz, one of the richest and most important parts of Bolivia.

After the joint Bolivian and North-American forces (with the CIA) captured and murdered Che and some of his guerrillas in La Higuera (only five members of the guerrilla group survived, managed to escape and reached Chile), Che's dead body was wrapped into a blanket, tied to the skid of a helicopter and carried to Vallegrande.
The body was spread in the laundry room in the backyard of the hospital Nuestra Señora de Malta, it was washed, then films and photographs were taken of the Christ-like figure.
Today the laundry room is unused and it is decorated with thousands of graffitis, made by the visitors who paid homage to the heroic guerrilla leader.

After the photos were taken, the body disappeared. The official version said that it was cremated and the ashes were scattered from a plane over the jungle. However, thirty years later it turned out to be a lie.

The bodies of Che and his murdered guerrillas were buried under a runway of an old airport in the outskirts of Vallegrande. The remains were found in 1997 after a retired Bolivian officer, Mario Vargas Salinas, who had taken part in Che's capture and murder, told the truth in 1995. He spoke to the American journalist, Jon Lee Anderson, who was collecting information about Che for his biography.
An extensive searching started by Cuban, Argentinian and Italian anthropologists, historians and geophysicists who examined the land within a circle of ten kilometres. They found several graves, and even Tania's (Tamara Bunke Bider) grave, two kilometres from the runway.

On 28th June 1997 seven graves were identified: Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara, the Cubans René Martínez Tamayo (Arturo), Alberto Fernández Montes de Oca (Pacho) and Orlando Pantoja Tamayo (Antonio), the Bolivians Simeón Cuba (Willy) and Aniceto Reynaga (Aniceto), and the Peruvian Juan Pablo Chang (El Chino).

Today a mausoleum stands on the place of the excavations. Eight slabstones show the place where the guerrillas and their commander were buried and found.

[Gallery with 13 photos]

Source

In August 1961, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon and Che Guevara faced off at an Interamerican conference in Punto del Este, Uruguay. Dillon, scion of the founder of the Wall Street investment bank Dillon, Read & Company, outlined the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress to a meeting of Latin American finance ministers. Dillon called it a blueprint for “a decade of democratic progress.” He noted that Latin American countries would have to reform their semi-feudal agricultural policies and backward tax systems in order to participate in the Alianza para el Progreso.

Dillon, elegantly attired in a dark pinstripe suit, promised that the United States would provide $1 billion in economic aid within six months, and another $20 billion in private and public capital over the next ten years. The infusion of aid and capital would spur economic growth. Economic growth would create jobs and money for housing, education, and public health, and lift Latin America out of poverty.

The Latin American finance ministers endorsed the Alliance for Progress in the Declaration of Punta del Este, but with little enthusiasm. White House aide Richard Goodwin recalls, “There was ... no outpouring of pledges to specific measures of social reform.”

Guevara, in his customary fatigues, combat boots, black beret, and a Cuban cigar in his hand, mesmerized the staid gathering of Latin American officials. He told the delegates that the real purpose of the Alliance for Progress was to contain the political appeal of the Cuban revolution in Latin America. The handsome, bearded revolutionary asserted that the Alianza was conceived “under the sign of Cuba, a free land in America,” as a conspicuously bored Dillon looked up at the ceiling and yawned. “This conference and the special treatment your delegates received and whatever loans are approved, all bear the name of Cuba, whether their beneficiaries like it or not."

But Guevara also held out an olive branch. “We cannot stop exporting an example, as the United States wishes, because an example is something that transcends borders,” he asserted. “What we do is give a guarantee that we will not export revolutions, we guarantee that not a single rifle will leave Cuba for battle in any other country of America.” Guevara announced Cuba was willing to negotiate with the United States “on any issue, without preconditions.” He said Cuba asked only to be free to develop along a different path from the rest of the Western Hemisphere without the threat of U.S. intervention.

In the meantime, Guevara followed up with a personal diplomatic initiative. Through an Argentine diplomat, Guevara sent a message to Goodwin, whom he had observed smoking cigars in Punta del Este. The diplomat told Goodwin, “Che ... bets you wouldn’t dare smoke Cuban cigars.” Goodwin replied, “You tell him that I’d love to smoke Cuban cigars.” The next day, two boxes of Cuban cigars were delivered to Goodwin’s hotel room. One was for Goodwin. The cigars for President Kennedy came in a large, polished mahogany box, inlaid with the official seal and flag of Cuba, with a note from Guevara. Word was passed to Goodwin by a third party, from Guevara, suggesting a meeting.

Guevara’s diplomacy by cigar was a stroke of creative statecraft. Photographs of bearded guerrillas and their cigars had become an icon of the Cuban revolution. The popularity of Cuban cigars also gave them diplomatic value. Both Fidel Castro and Jack Kennedy had been introduced to Cuban cigars by their fathers when they were boys.

When they did meet, Guevara thanked Goodwin for the Bay of Pigs operation, calling it “a great political victory” for the Cuban revolution. Guevara said that the Bay of Pigs enabled the revolution to further consolidate its hold on power and transformed Cuba “from a little aggrieved country to an equal.” Guevara said the Cuban revolution was socialist, stressing it was “irreversible” and could not be “overthrown from within.” He also noted that Cuba’s ties to the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc did not come about as the result of subversion but out of “natural sympathies and common beliefs.”

Guevara’s main reason for reaching out to Goodwin was to broach the idea of secret back-channel discussions with the United States. He suggested discussions to ease tensions between the two countries. Acknowledging that a formal diplomatic “understanding” might not be possible, he proposed subjects for discussion that might open up larger issues. Guevara said Havana would not return expropriated properties to U.S. owners, but would compensate the owners from Cuban exports to the United States. Cuba would not enter into a formal military or political alliance with the USSR and Eastern Europe and would not launch an attack on the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo. He also said Cuba was willing to discuss its “activities in other countries.”

When Goodwin returned to Washington, he informed President Kennedy about his meeting with Guevara, and recommended continuing the dialogue with Cuba. But Goodwin also interpreted Guevara’s willingness to initiate diplomatic talks as a sign of Cuba’s weakness, a weakness that he advised the administration to exploit. He urged President Kennedy to step up the CIA’s clandestine sabotage operations against economic targets on the island. Goodwin recalled, “[It] would have been politically difficult, perhaps impossible” to have negotiated “a deal with Castro, any kind of deal.”

On November 3, 1961, President Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose, a new covert operation to organize a popular uprising on the island, which would serve as a pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. Mongoose would use CIA personnel and resources but would not be run by the CIA. Kennedy chose Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as Mongoose’s chief of operations ... The Mongoose organization chart bore a resemblance to the model recommended by Richard Goodwin ... : A “command operation” run by Robert Kennedy. The attorney general would become the driving force of Mongoose, working closely with Lansdale to compensate for his own inexperience with intelligence operations.

Lansdale outlined Operation Mongoose in a January 1962 program review. In the initial phase, a nucleus of thirty CIA-trained Cuban “political action agents” would be covertly infiltrated into twenty localities in Cuba to form underground cells. Agent cells, with their own communications capabilities, would organize political actions and sabotage raids inside Cuba. “The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce the failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba’s economic needs, psychological operations to turn the people’s resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.”

Commando raids by CIA-backed Cuban exile action groups in the United States would complement Operation Mongoose. “Special support projects will be readied for use on call.” Lansdale wrote in a December 1961 memorandum, “These projects (such as operations to scuttle shipping and otherwise hamper the regime) will be timed to support actions by the movement [inside Cuba] and to permit the movement to take credit for them.” In this scenario, local political actions and sabotage operations would culminate in a popular uprising in October 1962, just before the congressional elections in the United States. Action agents would seize territory and issue an urgent “appeal” for help. Lansdale wrote, “The United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban people’s revolt.”

The “Guidelines for Operation Mongoose” predicated success explicitly on U.S. military intervention in Cuba. “In an undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that the final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention,” the Mongoose guidelines stated. “Such indigenous resources as developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it.”

When Robert Kennedy and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone met to assess Operation Mongoose in mid-summer 1962, they agreed the progress of the covert operation was “disappointing.”

McCone was hardly surprised. The U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of the post-Bay of Pigs situation in Cuba was similar to what Che Guevara told Goodwin in Punta del Este. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-61, published on November 28, 1961, called into question the U.S. ability to organize a popular rebellion against the Cuban revolution.

“The Castro regime has sufficient popular and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop in the foreseeable future,” according to SNIE 85-61. “It is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising could be fomented.” The report also pointed out that Cuban opposition groups had not yet “recovered from the blow dealt them” by the revolution after the Bay of Pigs.

Source